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Abstract
This paper investigates support for road pricing reform within a referendum voting choice model.
Central to this is how to identify believable ex-ante support for speciﬁc road pricing schemes. Our
approach is centred on a referendum voting choice model for alternative road pricing schemes,
with information that accounts for the degree of belief of the extent to which such schemes will
make voters better or worse oﬀ. We ﬁnd accounting for belief in the beneﬁts results in sizeable
reductions in the sensitivity to the levels of the charge, but quite small impacts on the sensitivity to
revenue allocation.
Date of receipt of ﬁnal manuscript: September 2012
453
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Volume 47, Part 3, September 2013, pp. 453–473
1.0 Introduction
Roads are possibly the most underpriced of all the public assets in terms of eﬃcient user
contributions. Regardless of whether some believe that governments should provide
more road capacity to combat traﬃc congestion, it is an undeniable fact that if we
provide more capacity under the existing road user pricing regimes and levels, more cars
will use the roads, quickly using up the additional capacity. The great sadness about all
of this is that there is a presumption that we all have rights to enter the traﬃc and delay
all other motorists, yet not contribute to the true cost associated with delay and lost time
— the ‘tragedy of the commons’. The future of public transport is also linked to this
tragedy of the commons, if one believes in the adage that ‘to make public transport
more attractive, we have to make the car less attractive’.
This paper develops a way of investigating community support for road pricing
reform within the framework of referendum voting. The challenge that many jurisdic-
tions face is persuading politicians and their advisers of the merits of road pricing
reform. Central to this task is how to identify, in a convincing way, ex-ante support for
speciﬁc road pricing schemes (deﬁned in terms of a charge, a regime, and a revenue allo-
cation plan), such that the evidence is believable. Our approach incorporates information
that accounts for the degree of perceptually conditioned subjective belief of voters, with
the alternative schemes making them better or worse oﬀ. Understanding degrees of belief
in perceived beneﬁts will provide critical guidance on ex-post support for a particular
scheme when implemented, and hence can be used to identify the likely support both ex-
ante and ex-post for speciﬁc road pricing schemes and promotional campaigns, in order
to reduce the ambiguity and uncertainty of outcomes that impact individual voters and
the community as a whole.
There is a burgeoning theoretical and empirical interest in how to get buy-in ex-ante
for proposed road pricing schemes in cities exposed to growing levels of traﬃc conges-
tion. We have reviewed this literature in Hensher and Li (2012). Two recent studies are
examples where a speciﬁc emphasis is placed on the important role of revenue allocation
in gaining support. Marcucci et al. (2005) use a citizen-candidate framework with a
population composed of three groups diﬀering in their income level, and show that road
pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in
favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is
relatively high. The results suggest that the eﬃciency of the redistribution of resources
from road to the alternative types of transport, as well as the fraction of the population
that uses the road transport, are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing
schemes.
De Borger and Proost (2012) use a simple majority voting model, and show that
individual uncertainty with respect to modal substitution costs may imply that a majority
votes against road pricing ex-ante, although a majority would have been in favour after
its introduction ex-post. Moreover, if a majority is against road pricing ex-ante, there
will also be no majority for organising an experiment that would take away the
individual uncertainty. Their model also suggests that political uncertainty with respect
to the use of the revenues corroborates the ﬁnding that ex-ante more voters will be
against the introduction of tolls. Both types of uncertainty suggest that fewer voters are
against road pricing when toll revenues are used to subsidise public transport than when
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they are redistributed to all voters. These results are consistent with recent empirical
observations (see Hensher and Puckett, 2005, 2007; Eliasson et al., 2009) on eﬀorts to
introduce road pricing, including the systematic rejection of road pricing in referenda,
the more favourable attitudes towards road pricing after than before its introduction,
and tying the revenues to support public transport.
The next section introduces the approach we have used to incorporate degrees of
belief associated with making choices in general, as well as in the context of a choice
experiment. We embed the degree of belief into a non-linear utility expression associated
with the alternative charging regimes and revenue allocation propositions as a mixed
logit choice model. We then discuss data needs and the design of a survey instrument
that captures all the required empirical information and present voting choice models to
identify the elasticities of interest in the presence and absence of accounting for percep-
tually conditioned subjective beliefs on scheme beneﬁts. The paper concludes with
suggestions for ongoing research.
2.0 Degrees of Belief and Road Pricing Schemes
This paper focuses on the voting (in a referendum) implications associated with recog-
nising degrees of belief when assessing buy-in via a voting choice model to alternative
road pricing schemes. In the current setting of road pricing reform, degrees of belief
underlie decision weights that provide perceptual conditioning of subjective probability
judgments associated with the extent to which each proposed road pricing scheme is
perceived by a respondent as making them better or worse oﬀ. This evidence, derived
directly as a numerical probability judgment, plays an important role in conditioning the
marginal (dis)utility attached to the elements of a road pricing scheme (namely, the
regime, the charge level, and revenue allocation). Such conditioning is aimed at
increasing, ex-ante, the external validity of voting preferences in a referendum context.
We can obtain a numerical subjective probability belief judgment through direct
questioning of individuals. For example, in terms of a proposed road pricing scheme:
Suppose that the government were to introduce a distance-based car use charge of X
c/km at congested (peak) periods and Y c/km at uncongested (oﬀ-peak) periods
throughout Sydney [or in the Sydney Central Business District], together with a
reduction in fuel excise of Tc/litre and a reduction in annual car registration
charge of $W per annum.1 Suppose also that revenue raised from a new road user
charging scheme will be spent as follows — X per cent to improve public transport,
Y per cent to improve existing and construct new roads, and W per cent to reduce
income tax, instead of being put into the government’s general revenue pool and
spent as they desire (and to compensate private tollroad companies for the revenue
loss from removal of tolls).
To what extent do you think that each of these schemes will make you better (or
worse) oﬀ (0¼ not at all; 100¼ deﬁnitely)?
1This can include the current fuel excise level.
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This measure can be used to obtain probabilistic belief weights, denoted by PðZÞ,
where Z is a subjective belief response scale (0–100) associated with the road pricing
scheme attributes in the utility expression for each alternative. It is well recognised in the
psychology literature (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) that degrees of belief are
implicit in most decisions whose outcomes depend on uncertain events. In quantitative
theories of decision making such as subjective expected utility theory or prospect theory,
degrees of belief are related to decision weights and are typically identiﬁed either by
prescribed levels as part of alternatives in a choice experiment, or in a more direct
manner using a linguistic device such as judgments of numerical probability. Such esti-
mates are often viewed as an approximation to the degrees of belief implicit in decisions
or preference revelation (see Fox, 1999). It is well recognised that numerical probability
judgments are often based on heuristics that produce biases. One of the methods
proposed to accommodate some aspects of such potential bias was the idea of a decision
weight (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) that accounts for the presence of perceptual con-
ditioning in the way that information reported by decision makers or information oﬀered
to decision makers is heuristically processed. Speciﬁcally, the value of an outcome is
weighted not by its probability, but instead by a decision (or belief) weight, w(.), that
represents the impact of the relevant probability on the valuation of the prospect. w(.)
need not be interpreted as a measure of subjective belief — a person may believe that the
probability of a road pricing scheme making them better oﬀ is, for example, 0.5, but
may aﬀord this event a weight of more or less than 0.5 in the evaluation of a prospect.
A number of functional forms have been used in the literature to capture the extent
of deviation between an obtained belief probability and a perceptually conditioned belief
probability. We have chosen the popular form in equation (1), where wð pÞ is the
probability belief weight function, po is the subjective belief probability associated with
the speciﬁc road pricing scheme, and g is the probability weighting parameter to be
estimated, which measures the degree of curvature of the belief weighting function.
Equation (1) is an inverse S-shaped single-parameter weighting function with over-
weighting of low belief probabilities, and under-weighting of medium to high belief
probabilities for values of 0 < g < 1. This is the form originally proposed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), which has been widely used in psychology and behavioural economics:
wð poÞ ¼
pgo
½ pgo þ ð1 poÞgð1=gÞ
: ð1Þ
In the empirical assessment of alternative road pricing schemes, we include revenue
allocation as a crucial feature, in line with the evidence from the literature of its inﬂuence
in engendering support or otherwise for a road pricing scheme (Hensher and Li, 2012).
This is in addition to the description of a road pricing regime (for example, cordon or
distance-based), and pricing levels for existing (for example, fuel, registration) and new
charges. We speculate that the weighting parameter, g, is likely to be diﬀerent for the
revenue allocation plan compared to the actual pricing scheme.
To complete the functional speciﬁcation, we deﬁne a risk parameter a which reﬂects
the presence of risk aversion, risk taking, and risk neutrality (depending on its empirical
value) for accommodating risky decision making with respect to the road pricing
schemes being assessed. The pricing levels associated with the new cordon or distance-
based charges are represented as a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) model form,
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deﬁned by a general power speciﬁcation (that is, U ¼ x1 a=ð1 aÞ) (see Holt and
Laury, 2002; Andersen et al., 2012).
The attribute-speciﬁc representation in the utility expressions associated with each
alternative road pricing scheme (rpcr) in the voting choice model is given in equation (2),
where g may empirically diﬀer between the belief weight attached to the new pricing
charges and the revenue allocation proposal:
Urpcr ¼ brpcrf½WðPðZÞQiÞrpcr1 a þWðPð1 ZÞQiÞrpcr1 a=ð1 aÞg: ð2Þ
Qi relates to beliefs in the context of the extent to which the charging scheme (i ¼ 1)
will make the voter better (or worse) oﬀ; similarly, for revenue allocation, Qi (i ¼ 2)
relates to beliefs in the context of whether the proposed allocation of revenue will be
perceived to make the voter better (or worse) oﬀ. There are also a number of other
variables in the utility expression that are not speciﬁed this way, and are added in as
linear in parameters. The presence of a and g results in an embedded attribute-speciﬁc
treatment in the overall utility expression associated with each alternative that is non-
linear in a number of parameters. Only if ð1 aÞ ¼ 1, and g ¼ 1, does equation (2)
collapse to a linear utility function. We implement this framework with new data,
including a stated choice experiment. Before doing so we set out the full likelihood
function that accommodates the non-linear parameter form for the voter choice model.
3.0 A Mixed Multinomial Logit Model with Non-linear Utility Functions
A mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model with non-linear utility functions is used to
obtain parameter estimates for the voter choice model. The general form departs from a
standard linear-in-parameters random utility model with utility functions deﬁned over Jit
choices available to individual i in choice situation t, and alternative m:
Wði; t;mÞ ¼ Uði; t;mÞ þ eitm; m ¼ 1; . . . ; Jit; t ¼ 1; . . . ;Ti; i ¼ 1; . . . ;N; ð3Þ
with the IID, type I extreme value distribution assumed for the random terms eitm.
Conditioned on Uði; t;mÞ, the choice probabilities take the familiar multinomial logit
form, as shown in equation (4):
Probði; t; jÞ ¼ exp½Uði; t; jÞXJit
m¼ 1
exp½Uði; t;mÞ
: ð4Þ
The utility functions that accommodate non-linearity in the unknown parameters,
even where the parameters are non-random, are built up from an extension of the
MMNL structure, along similar lines to Andersen et al. (2012), but with extensions to
incorporate scale heterogeneity:
Uði; t;mÞ ¼ si½Vmðxitm; bi;wiÞ; ð5:1Þ
Vmðxitm; bi;wiÞ ¼ hmðxitm; biÞ þ
XK
k¼ 1
dkmykwik; ð5:2Þ
bi ¼ bþ vi: ð5:3Þ
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The various parts allow several degrees of ﬂexibility. In equation (5.2), the function
hm(..) is an arbitrary non-linear function that deﬁnes the underlying utilities (preferences)
across alternatives. It is within hm(..) that we embed the attribute-speciﬁc belief
weights and risk attitudes for the road pricing schemes.
PK
k¼ 1 dkmykwik are the error
components where the wik are normally distributed eﬀects with zero mean,
i ¼ 1; . . . ;M4 J and ckm ¼ 1, if m appears in utility function j, and yk is the standard
deviation parameter.
Heterogeneity in the preference parameters of the model is shown in equation (5.3),
where bi varies around the overall constant b in response to unobservable heterogeneity
in vi. The parameters of the distribution of bi are the overall mean (that is, b) and the
Cholesky square root (lower triangle) of the covariance matrix of the random com-
ponents, . The random components are assumed to have known, ﬁxed (usually at zero)
means, to have constant known variances (usually one), and to be uncorrelated. In the
most common applications, multivariate standard normality would be assumed for vi.
The covariance matrix of bi would then be  ¼ . Parameters that are not random are
included in the general form of the model, by imposing rows of zeros in  including the
diagonal elements. A non-random parameters model would have  ¼ 0 in entirety.
Parameters of the model are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood. The log
likelihood function based on equations (3), (4), and (5) is given in equation (6):
logLðb;; h j X; y;w; vÞ ¼
XN
i¼ 1
log
YTi
t¼ 1
Pði; t; j j wi; viÞ: ð6Þ
The conditioning is on the unobservables w, v and the observables Xi, yi, where Xi is
the full data set of attributes and characteristics, xi,t,m, and yi is a full set of binary
indicators, yitm, that marks which alternative is chosen, yitj¼ 1, and which are not,
yitm¼ 0, in each choice situation. In full:
Probði; t; jÞ ¼
YJit
q¼ 1
exp½Uði; t; jÞ
XJit
m¼ 1
exp½Uði; t;mÞ
2
64
3
75
yitq
: ð7Þ
To estimate the model parameters, it is necessary to obtain the log likelihood uncon-
ditioned on the unobservable elements. The unconditional log likelihood is:
logLðb;; h j X; yÞ ¼
XN
i¼ 1
log
Z
wi ;vi
YTi
t¼ 1
Pði; t; j jwi; viÞ  f ðwi; viÞ½  dwi dvi: ð8Þ
Since the integrals do not exist in closed form, they are approximated, using simu-
lation. The simulated log likelihood function is:
logLSðb;; h jX; yÞ ¼
XN
i¼ 1
log
1
R
XR
r¼ 1
YTi
t¼ 1
P½i; t; j jwiðrÞ; viðrÞ; ð9Þ
where P½i; t; jjwiðrÞ; viðrÞ is computed from equation (4) and equations (5.1) to (7) using
R simulated draws, wi(r), vi(r) from the assumed populations. For optimisation, the
derivatives of the simulated log likelihood function must be simulated as well (see
Hensher et al. (2011) for details).
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4.0 The Road Pricing Data Collection Approach
The survey instrument was an online computer assisted personal interview (CAPI)
accessed via laptops used by interviewers who sat with the respondents to provide any
advice that was required in working through the survey, while not oﬀering answers to
any of the questions. The two key elements of the survey are the belief questions and the
voter choice experiment. The belief question was linked to each of the alternatives
(excluding the status quo alternative) presented in the choice games, and was asked prior
to the choice games.
The choice experiment consisted of three alternatives: two labelled alternatives
representing a cordon-based charging scheme; and a distance-based charging scheme,
randomly assigned to road pricing schemes 1 and 2 (see Figure 1 below), and the status
quo. Each alternative was described by attributes representing the average amount of
tolls and fuel outlaid weekly, the annual vehicle registration charge and the allocation of
revenues raised to improve public transport, improve and expand upon the existing road
network, to reduce income tax, to contribute to general government revenue, and to
compensate tollroad companies for loss of toll revenue. The cordon-based charging
scheme and a distance-based alternative were also described by either a peak and oﬀ-
peak cordon-based charging amount, or a peak or oﬀ-peak per kilometre distance-based
charge. Both non-status quo alternatives were also described by the year proposed that
the scheme would commence.
A Bayesian D-eﬃcient experimental design was implemented for the study. The
design was generated in such a way that the cost-related attribute levels for the status quo
were ﬁrst acquired from respondents during preliminary questions in the survey, while
associated attributes for the cordon-based and distance-based charging schemes were
pivoted oﬀ of these as minus percentage shifts representing a reduction in such costs for
these schemes. Pivoted attributes included average fuel costs and annual registration
fees. Fuel costs were reduced by anywhere between 0 per cent and 50 per cent of the
respondent-reported values, either representing no reduction in fuel taxes or up to a
potential 100 per cent reduction. Registration fees were reduced to between 0 per cent
and 100 per cent from the respondent-reported values (see Rose et al. (2008) for a descrip-
tion of pivot-type designs). Toll was only included in the status quo alternative, being set
to zero for the non-status quo alternatives since it is replaced by the road pricing regime.
The allocation of revenues raised were ﬁxed for the status quo alternative, but varied
in the cordon-based and distance-based charging schemes over choice tasks. The
allocation of revenue varied from 0 per cent to 100 per cent for a given revenue stream
category. Within a charging scheme, the allocation of revenue was such that the sum had
to equal 100 per cent across all possible revenue allocations.
The cordon-based charging alternative was also described by a peak and oﬀ-peak
cordon charge. The peak charge varied between $2.00 and $20.00, while the oﬀ-peak
charge varied between $0.00 and $15.00. Likewise, the distance-based charge was also
described by two distance-based charging attributes, one for trips taken during peak
periods and the second for oﬀ-peak trips. The per-kilometre charge for the peak period
ranged from $0.05 per kilometre to $0.40 per kilometre, while the oﬀ-peak distance-
based charge varied between $0.00 and $0.30 per kilometre. The ranges selected were
based on those that we believed would contain the most likely levels if implemented. The
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design was generated in such a way that the peak cordon-based and peak per-kilometre-
based charges were always equal to or greater than the associated oﬀ-peak charges.
Finally, the cordon-based and distance-based charging schemes were described by the
year in which the scheme would be implemented. In each case, this was varied between
2013 (representing one year from the survey) and 2016 (representing a four-year delay
from the time of the survey).
The attributes and the relevant attribute levels for all alternatives are shown in
Table 1. Priors for the design were obtained from a pilot study consisting of nine respon-
dents collected prior to the main ﬁeld phase. The ﬁnal design consisted of sixty choice
tasks which were blocked into ﬁfteen blocks of four choice tasks each. The blocking was
accomplished by using an algorithm designed to minimise the maximum absolute
correlation between the design attributes and the blocking column.
The ﬁnal belief and choice screens are presented in Figures 1 and 2, with the bound-
aries of the proposed cordon-based charge area shown in Figure 3. Respondents had to
be of voting age. The main survey of 200 residents was undertaken in April 2012 in the
Sydney Metropolitan Area. A descriptive proﬁle of the data is given in Tables 2a and
2b. Interviews took, on average, 46.2 minutes, but were as short as 12.37 minutes and as
long as 88.5 minutes.
Table 1
The Choice Experiment Attribute Levels and Range
Attribute Status quo Cordon-based scheme Distance-based scheme
Year scheme introduced – 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016
Average fuel per week User reported
level
0%, 10%, 20%,
30%, 40%, 50%
0%, 10%, 20%,
30%, 40%, 50%
Average toll per week User reported
level
$0.00 $0.00
Annual vehicle registration User reported
level
0%, 25%, 50%,
75%, 100%
0%, 25%, 50%,
75%, 100%
Peak cordon-based
charge (per trip)
$0.00 $2.00, $6.50, $11.00,
$15.50, $20.00
–
Oﬀ-peak cordon-based
charge (per trip)
$0.00 $0.00, $3.00, $6.00,
$9.00, $12.00, $15.00
–
Peak distance-based
charge (per km)
$0.00 – $0.05, $0.12, $0.19,
$0.26, $0.33, $0.40
Oﬀ-peak distance-based
charge (per km)
$0.00 – $0.00, $0.06, $0.12,
$0.18, $0.24, $0.30
% of funds allocated to
public transport
0% 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
% of funds allocated to
road infrastructure
30% 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
% of funds allocated to
reducing tax
0% 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
% of funds allocated to
general revenue
65% 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
% of funds allocated to
private (toll) ﬁrms
5% 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
0%, 20%, 40%, 60%,
80%, 100%
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The average weekly cost for the status quo is $66.86 (standard deviation of $45.76
and a maximum of $261.50); in contrast, the average associated with road price (RP)
scheme 1 is $60.60 (standard deviation of $49.86 and maximum of $446.10), and for
road price scheme 2 it is $58.87 (standard deviation of $50.28 and maximum of $415.70).
When we diﬀerence each of the schemes against the status quo (see Figure 4), for RP
scheme 1 we have an average of $6.26 in favour of the status quo (with a standard
deviation of $32.50 and range from $208.50 to $133.70), and for RP scheme 2 we have
a mean diﬀerence of $7.99 in favour of the status quo, with a standard deviation of
$32.53 and range from $178.20 to $166.70. This indicates that the randomisation of the
two RP schemes between the two non-status quo alternatives has resulted in similar proﬁles
of each alternative across the sample, as expected.
Another way of presenting the RP schemes is to distinguish a cordon-based (CB)
and a distance-based (DB) charging scheme. The CB schemes average $48.46 per week;
in contrast, the DB schemes average $71.00 per week. The latter is close to the mean
status quo cost of $66.86, whereas the CB proposals have a signiﬁcantly lower weekly
cost, clearly due to reduced fuel and registration charges, and no metropolitan-wide
tolls.
Figure 1
Illustrative Belief Screen
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Over the range of RP schemes investigated, we see a marked support over the status
quo situation, with only 19.6 per cent of the sample across four choice sets per respon-
dent voting for maintaining the status quo. Thus, over 80 per cent of the time, the
sample would vote for a new road pricing scheme. This is impressive and does suggest
that there is some support for pricing reform where changes are also made in fuel
(reducing for a mean of $46.12 to $34.60), registration (reducing from a mean of $680
per year to $340 per annum), and toll costs (reducing for a mean of $7.67 per week to
zero) as part of the pricing reform package.
When we consider the extent to which respondents believe that they will be better oﬀ
under a speciﬁc RP scheme, 61.8 per cent believe they will be better oﬀ under a proposed
cordon-based reform initiative, while 49.5 per cent believe they will be better oﬀ under a
proposed distance-based scheme. This evidence is encouraging and the contrast of
these two percentages lines up well with the average weekly costs associated with the two
schemes of $48.46 and $71.01 respectively. Clearly the ex-ante support must be
determined in the context of a very speciﬁc RP scheme, which we undertake as a set of
simulated scenarios once the voting choice model is estimated. Whether this ex-ante
Figure 2
Illustrative Voting Choice Screen
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evidence would translate ex-post into support for road pricing if a referendum were held
is unknown.
The distribution of revenues generated from congestion charging is the key to politi-
cal support, as Goodwin (1997) claimed: ‘discussion of road pricing without explicit
attention to the use of revenue streams is inherently unlikely to be able to command a
consensus in its support.’ With regard to revenue distribution strategies, Small (1992)
suggested that a package of travel allowances, tax reductions, and improved public
transport be introduced as part of the buy-in plan. Goodwin (1989) proposed a
combination of road improvements, public transport improvements, and the general
fund of the city or state. The evidence from this study is that the sample supports 38.9
per cent of revenue raised being allocated to public transport improvements, 32 per cent
to improving existing roads and construction of new roads, 16.1 per cent to reducing
personal income tax, and the balance of approximately 13 per cent to compensating
tollroad companies for loss of revenue and payments into government-consolidated
revenue.
Two important features of the data are establishing the extent to which respondents
are aware of what road pricing means and their familiarity with the road pricing debate.
An indication was provided by 38 per cent of respondents that they are aware of what
road pricing means, while 22.6 per cent expressed familiarity with the debate. In
addition, over 91 per cent of respondents indicated that they would support a road
pricing reform trial, and furthermore that it would only take, on average, a 9 cents per
Figure 3
The Location of the Cordon-charge Area
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km peak charge to encourage a signiﬁcant switch in car travel out of the peak periods
(7–9 a.m. and 4–6 p.m. weekdays).
5.0 Voter Choice Models
The voting choice models are summarised in Table 3. Both models allow for preference het-
erogeneity and risk attitude, the latter only included for the new distance- or cordon-based
Table 2a
Descriptive Proﬁle of Sample
Status quo variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total cost (per week) 66.86 45.76 0 261.5
Fuel cost (per week) 46.12 34.99 0 200
Tolls per week 7.67 14.63 0 100
Vehicle registration per annum 679.65 464.99 0 3,200
Alternative voted for if a referendum on road pricing (%) 19.6 0 1
Alternative chosen as best for respondent (%) 20.3 0 1
Alternative chosen is seen as best for the community (%) 16.8 0 1
Cordon road pricing scheme variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total cost (per week) 48.46 36.69 0 243.9
Fuel cost (per week) 34.46 27.25 0 180
Tolls per week 0 0 0 0
Vehicle registration per annum 339.9 377.38 0 3,200
Peak charge (7–9 a.m., 4–6 p.m.) $ per entry 11.05 6.37 2 20
Oﬀ-peak charge $ per entry 5.83 4.50 0 15
Cordon charges per week 7.47 17.05 0 132
Peak period weekly cordon cost outlay 3.58 9.75 0 83.5
Oﬀ-peak period weekly cordon cost outlay 3.89 9.58 0 84.1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alternative voted for if a referendum on road pricing (%) 49.6 0 1
Alternative chosen as best for respondent (%) 50.6 0 1
Alternative chosen is seen as best for the community (%) 49.5 0 1
Road pricing scheme is acceptable (%) 76.4 0 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Revenue allocated to public transport (%) 21.2 27.5 0 100
Revenue allocated to existing and construct roads (%) 18.4 26.5 0 100
Revenue allocated to reduce personal income tax (%) 20.9 26.3 0 100
Revenue allocated to private tollroad company (%) 18.9 29.2 0 100
Revenue allocated to general govt revenue (%) 20.7 27.6 0 100
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Belief that the road pricing scheme will:
make you better oﬀ 0.62 0.33 0 1
be fair for the community 0.24 0.33 0 1
be eﬀective in reducing traﬃc congestion 0.27 0.33 0 1
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 47, Part 3
464
charging components. Model 1 also includes the belief weights that condition the marginal
utility or disutility weights attached to the new distance- or cordon-based charging
components, and the revenue allocation categories. These models are non-linear in the risk
attitude and belief functions (see equation (2)). We investigated the potential role of
awareness and familiarity, but found that these inﬂuences were not statistically signiﬁcant
in the presence of the signiﬁcant inﬂuences in Table 3. Notably, there was a strong corre-
lation between belief, awareness, and familiarity, which may explain this non-signiﬁcance.
The overall goodness of ﬁt of the model with embedded belief is signiﬁcantly better
than the model that ignores the role of belief. All parameter estimates are signiﬁcant at
the 10 per cent or better level of statistical conﬁdence, with the majority of parameters
being signiﬁcant at well above the 5 per cent conﬁdence level.
The diﬀerence in the probability weighting parameter g which measures the degree of
curvature of the belief weighting function in Model 1, associated with belief conditioning
for the new charging level and the revenue allocation, is an important ﬁnding, suggesting
that as gamma approaches 1, the function is linear in the belief probability weighting. A
gamma less than 1 in the positive domain will tend to lead to greater divergence at the
extreme range of the probability distribution between the reported belief probability and
Table 2a
Continued
Distance-based road pricing scheme variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total cost (per week) 71.01 58.44 0 446
Fuel cost (per week) 34.62 28.65 0 200
Tolls per week 0 0 0 0
Vehicle registration per annum 342.4 374.2 0 3,200
Peak charge (7–9 a.m., 4–6 p.m.) $ per week given weekly kilometres 15.12 22.01 0 160
Oﬀ-peak charge $ per week given weekly kilometres 14.68 25.26 0 234
Peak period distance-based cost per km ($/km) 0.225 0.120 0.05 0.40
Oﬀ-peak period distance-based cost per km ($/km) 0.101 0.097 0 0.3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alternative voted for if a referendum on road pricing (%) 30.6 0 1
Alternative chosen as best for respondent (%) 29.1 0 1
Alternative chosen is seen as best for the community (%) 33.6 0 1
Road pricing scheme is acceptable (%) 55.9
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Revenue allocated to public transport (%) 21.1 30.5 0 100
Revenue allocated to existing and construct roads (%) 18.6 27.2 0 100
Revenue allocated to reduce personal income tax (%) 22.5 28.4 0 100
Revenue allocated to private tollroad company (%) 20.5 26.9 0 100
Revenue allocated to general govt revenue (%) 17.3 26.48 0 100
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Belief that the road pricing scheme will:
make you better oﬀ 0.49 0.349 0 1
be fair for the community 0.21 0.314 0 1
be eﬀective in reducing traﬃc congestion 0.27 0.334 0 1
Note: Tables 2a and 2b can be merged as needed.
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the perceptual conditioned belief probability, in contrast to situations where gamma
exceeds 1.
The mean response on the subjective belief scale is 0.56, with a standard deviation of
0.34, and a skewness of 0.25. The perceptually conditioned belief weight distribution
Table 2b
Descriptive Proﬁle of Sample
Other descriptive data Mean
Std
deviation Min Max
Peak kilometres per week 70.68 88.58 0 400
Oﬀ-peak kilometres per week 145.9 143.6 0 977.5
Proportion of weekly kilometres in peak 0.297 0.269 0 0.99
Weekly hours travelling by car and motorbike 7.60 6.68 0 50
Weekly CBD trips 1.85 3.48 0 18
Preferred revenue allocated to public transport (%) 38.86 18.50 0 100
Preferred revenue to existing and construct roads (%) 32.03 14.44 0 70
Preferred revenue to reduce personal income tax (%) 16.06 16.83 0 100
Preferred revenue to private toll road company (%) 6.20 8.11 0 50
Preferred revenue to general govt revenue (%) 6.86 8.41 0 30
Extent of awareness of what road pricing means (%) 38.03 29.24 0 100
How familiar are you with the debate on road pricing (%) 22.63 27.09 0 100
Conﬁdence in public sector allocating revenue as you
indicated (%)
22.32 0 100
Would support a road pricing trial (%) 91.8 0 100
Cents per km to switch from peak travel if price
selected (84% sample)
9.06 5.02 2 15
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Amount spent per week on fuel ($) 46.12 34.98 0 200
Amount spent per week on tolls ($) 7.67 14.63 0 100
Amount spent per week on public transport fares ($) 13.02 25.70 0 96
Annual vehicle registration excl insurances ($) 679.6 464.8 0 3200
Percentage of fuel and toll costs paid by respondent (%) 84.6 0 100
Percentage of fuel and toll costs paid by business
respondent owns (%)
3.53 0 100
Percentage of fuel and toll costs paid by another
business (%)
8.88 0 100
Number of privately registered cars in household 1.85 1.01 0 5
Number of household business registered cars in
household
0.19 0.83 0 9
Number of other business registered cars in household 0.11 0.31 0 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Age of respondent 50.6 14.2 30 70
Annual personal gross income 74,225 53,167 10,000 250,000
Male 35.6 0 1
No. of people in household 17 years plus 2.79 1.13 1 7
No. of people in household 11–17 years old 0.24 0.58 0 3
No. of people in household under 11 years old 0.31 0.71 0 4
No. of people in household who hold a valid driver’s
licence
2.53 1.06 0 4
Survey interview time (mins) 46.2 12.37 11.4 88.5
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has a mean of 0.30 (standard deviation of 0.30 and skewness of 0.69) related to the new
distance- and cordon-based charging levels, and 0.35 (standard deviation of 0.39 and skew-
ness of 0.55) for revenue allocation.
Given the two estimated parameters for gamma related to the new distance- and
cordon-based charging levels and the revenue allocation plan, the resulting belief
weights have been obtained using the functional form from Tversky and Kahneman
(1974), given in equation (2). A plot of the reported subjective belief response prob-
ability against the perceptually conditioned belief weights is given in Figure 5. The
ﬁndings are similar to what are reported in the many prospect theory studies in respect
of decision weights.
At low levels of subjective belief probability, up to 0.3, we ﬁnd that the perceptual
conditioned belief probability is higher for the belief function associated with the new
classes of charging; however, as we move beyond 0.3, the perceptually conditioned belief
probability is lower than the subjective response. This suggests that there is a tendency
to underestimate the belief probability at low levels of subjective belief probabilities (up
to 0.3) and to overestimate the subjective belief response at higher levels of probability
(over 0.3), with the greatest gap at around 0.9. Likewise, when considering the belief
weights associated with revenue allocation, there is a tendency to overestimate the
Figure 4
Diﬀerence in Weekly Cost Outlay: Status Quo Minus Road Pricing Scheme
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subjective response belief probabilities up to 0.7 with a negligible diﬀerence (albeit
marginally underestimated) over 0.7.
It is clear from this evidence that perceptual conditioning does matter, especially at
the very low and very high probabilities, suggesting that perceptual conditioning moves
the belief probabilities towards 0.5 in comparison to what is reported. That is, the
extremes of the subjective belief distribution are suppressed as a result of perceptual con-
ditioning for the new distance- and cordon-based charging levels. For revenue allocation
the opposite occurs, with perceptual conditioning tending to downscale the subjective
Table 3
Summary of Voting Choice Models: 800 Observations (200 Respondents)
Model 1
(embedded belief)
Model 2
(no account for
beliefs)
Attributes Parameter t-ratio Parameter t-ratio
Mean of random parameters:
Current cost elements (fuel, registration, tolls) (per week) 0.0412 4.31 0.05534 5.42
New distance- or cordon-based charging (per week) 0.0969 3.04 0.2258 6.24
Per cent of revenue allocated to:
improving public transport 0.0619 7.24 0.0222 5.52
improving existing and construct new roads 0.0376 6.11 0.0142 3.71
reducing personal income tax 0.0472 6.40 0.0152 4.23
Standard deviation or spread of random parameters:
Current cost elements (fuel, registration, tolls) (per week) (t; 2) 0.0824 4.31 0.1107 5.42
New distance- or cordon-based charging (per week)
(lognormal)
0.2027 4.00 0.1991 4.87
Improving public transport (lognormal) 0.0403 3.03 0.0220 3.00
Improving existing and construct new roads (lognormal) 0.0233 1.81 0.0191 2.15
Reducing personal income tax (lognormal) 0.0385 2.95 0.0136 1.51
Non-random parameters:
Alpha (risk attitude) 0.2749 1.68 0.6649 13.2
Gamma for new distance- or cordon-based charging (belief
conditioning)
0.5268 2.11 – –
Gamma for revenue allocation (belief conditioning) 1.5646 4.13 – –
Status quo constant 0.7848 1.01 2.2188 2.36
Male (1,0) 1.0318 1.60 1.3288 1.77
Annual personal income (‘000s) 0.0117 1.81 0.0112 1.51
Total one-way trips per week 0.0533 2.31 0.0539 2.08
Error component:
Sigma (non-status quo alternatives) 2.9510 5.91 3.4003 6.19
Model ﬁt:
Log-likelihood (0) 878.89 878.89
Log-likelihood at convergence 568.58 623.04
Adjusted pseudo R2 0.353 0.291
AIC (sample adjusted) 1.456 1.593
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belief response probabilities throughout the entire distribution, up to 0.7, and no eﬀect
beyond 0.7.
The belief weighting function is a transformation of a stated degree of belief, and as
such there is the potential risk of endogeneity bias (EB). EB can arise from a number of
sources such as measurement error, missing attributes, and simultaneity; it is observed
when a speciﬁc variable included in the observed eﬀects is correlated with the error term
associated with the utility expression containing the explanatory variable of interest. To
ensure that the belief weighting function is purged of its endogeneity bias (that is, the
part that is correlated with the random error component), we undertook two tasks.
First, we tested the extent to which the belief weight has systematic inﬂuence on the stan-
dard deviation of the error component; and second, we identiﬁed other exogenous vari-
ables that are correlated with the belief weight, but not with the error component that
could be used as instrumental variables, or simply as evidence of no endogeneity bias.
An important ﬁnding is that the belief weight transform purges the correlation compared
to the use of the stated belief response, eﬀectively eliminating the possibility of endo-
geneity bias. We included the belief weights in the error component decomposition and
found that they had t-values of 0.04 and 0.18 respectively for the new charges and
the revenue allocation belief functions, which suggests that the belief weights have no corre-
lated inﬂuence on the error components. Hence we conclude that there is no statistically
observed evidence of endogeneity bias.
As expected, there is a greater variance in the unobserved eﬀects associated with the
road pricing scheme alternatives, captured by the statistically signiﬁcant sigma parameter
for the error component associated with the two road pricing alternatives. This is a
plausible ﬁnding, suggesting that there is greater unobserved heterogeneity within the
Figure 5
Belief Weights and Perceptual Conditioning
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voting population, as represented by the sample, in respect of the role of unobserved
inﬂuences on the probability of voting for the road pricing schemes in comparison to
voting to stay with the status quo.
The inferred mean direct elasticities of probability of voting for a road pricing
scheme with respect to a speciﬁc attribute associated with a proposed road pricing
scheme are summarised in Table 4. The most revealing ﬁnding is that when account is
taken of the belief that respondents have in the extent to which a road pricing scheme
will make them better or worse oﬀ, and after the subjective belief response data on the
0–100 scale is adjusted for perceptual conditioning, the mean estimate of the impact of a
percentage change in the charge is considerably smaller than would be the case if beliefs
were not accounted for. For the way that the raised revenue is allocated, the mean esti-
mate of the impact of a percentage change in revenue allocation is lower when beliefs are
accounted for, but the diﬀerence is quite small.
To illustrate the likelihood of a vote in a referendum for a speciﬁc road pricing
scheme, we have selected a number of schemes that might represent the range of options
under consideration by government. Model 1 with embedded belief is applied to the
sample, using a simulator that allows for random parameters, and all non-linearity in
belief and risk attitudes. These are summarised in Table 5, together with the predicted
proportion of the population that would vote for the scheme based on the sample being
representative of the voting population.
The ﬁndings show clearly that a cordon-based charge in the CBD is a sensible initial
scheme to introduce, since it is predicted ex-ante to obtain more than a 50 per cent (that
is, 62.4 per cent) vote when the daily peak entry charge is $8 and the oﬀ-peak charge is
$3, and 100 per cent of funds are allocated to public transport improvements (RP
scheme 12). This reduces to 60.9 per cent when the revenue is allocated 50:50 to public
transport and road improvements (RP scheme 13). Distance-based charging (RP schemes
5–7, 9–11) is clearly less popular, with the highest percentage voting for a scheme in the
examples in Table 5 being 32.2 per cent. A particularly important ﬁnding is that when
the revenue allocation is recognised in conjunction with distance-based charging, the
support increases from 17.6 per cent to between 25.5 and 27.1 per cent (depending on
the revenue allocation plan). The evidence reinforces the view in the growing literature
that how the revenue is allocated is critical in obtaining buy-in to road pricing proposals
(see Hensher and Li, 2012). What we have been able to do for the ﬁrst time is identify
the very speciﬁc role of revenue allocation in inﬂuencing, ex-ante, the voting intentions
of the population.
Table 4
Mean Direct Elasticities of Probability of Voting Choice
Attribute of road pricing scheme
Model 1
(embedded belief)
Model 2
(no account for beliefs)
Current cost elements (fuel, registration, tolls) (per week) 0.463 0.662
New distance- or cordon-based charging (per week) 0.062 0.273
Improving public transport 0.156 0.139
Improving existing and construct new roads 0.107 0.092
Reducing personal income tax 0.135 0.116
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6.0 Conclusions
The substantive empirical ﬁndings oﬀer new evidence on the ex-ante probability of
voting for a range of road pricing schemes, accounting for the regime (that is, cordon-
or distance-based), the charge level (ﬁxed per time of entry or cents per km by peak and
oﬀ-peak times), and how the revenue raised is allocated. There exists, to varying degrees,
ex-ante support (or buy-in) for speciﬁc road pricing schemes if they were subject to a
referendum vote. It is clear that how the revenue is allocated has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the level of support, and that introducing a cordon-based charging scheme in the
CBD that has diﬀerent ﬁxed charges for the peak and oﬀ-peak is a wise transitional
strategy to a full roll-out in the future of a metropolitan-wide distance-based charging
scheme.
This paper also promotes a view that subjective beliefs about the extent to which a
road pricing scheme will make someone better or worse oﬀ should, after perceptual con-
ditioning, be included in a voting choice model, as a way of recognising the role of belief
in voting outcomes. The evidence herein highlights the important role of belief, and in
particular how its inﬂuence increases the support for voting for a road pricing scheme
compared to ignoring such relevant information.
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